In the modern game, it’s abnormal for a team to defend the whole width of the pitch with just 3 players at the very back line, especially when a team like Brighton is facing against Arsenal. However, the away team managed to do so through strict discipline of mixing zonal and man marking in an effective manner. This piece will take a look at Brighton’s behaviour out of possession and how Arteta countered against Potter’s match plan.
Basic Set up
Arsenal prepared their attacking structure in the form of 4–3–3 with the CF (Lacazette) dropping off several times towards their right-hand side, and Xhaka occasionally positioning inwards from the left FB position he was allocated to. Lots of emphasis was placed on receiving in between the lines / on the feet through specific rotations and movements in the midfield.
The very front line of Brighton’s defensive structure had Welbeck pressing the 2 CBs to lock their build up play into one side and Mac Allister screening Lokonga as DM. After the 1st goal scored by Trossard, a change was made to have both Welbeck and Mac Allister screening Lokonga, as the previous way of pressing saw Gabriel being wide open. WGs on both sides (Trossard / Groβ) then had to close down central pass routes to not let Gunners’ midfielders receive in between the lines whilst maintaining access to the wide players in order to press whenever the pass was made from their back line.
Although the previously mentioned part of the pressing was quite relaxed with very few high pressing sequences, situations in the midfield were chaotic with strict man-marking. This saw Potter choose a rare partnership of Mwepu, Caicedo, and Bissouma in midfield, all of whom are more adept in their physical attributes to win 1vs1 duels compared to other midfielders.
Going back to the frustrating draw at home against Norwich last week, the 2 DMs chosen were Mac Allister and Groβ whose technical abilities on the feet exceed others. With the match requiring quick circulation of the ball against Norwich’s mid / low block, the selection is reasonable and it’s quite interesting to read certain matches through the lens of Potter’s selection of players.
Mwepu matched up with Emile Smith Rowe, Caicedo against Ødegaard, and as Lacazette roamed around the midfield, it was Bissouma and Dunk’s responsibility to watch him. When there was any kind of rotation, Brighton players tried to switch up the player to mark in order to eliminate any unnecessary spaces.
Arsenal’s 2 wide WGs were then marked up by the wide CBs, positioning not too wide in order to open a big gap in between Dunk but wide enough to stop the long switch from the back line to the WG. This created a frustrating situation for the home team where the CBs made no progressive passes whilst having time on the ball, due to all the options being blocked.
One could argue that Trossard and Groβ were WBs, but considering how high they were because of the defensive tasks set out by Potter, it is fair to say that they are more attacking than a WB. Very few runs in behind also made Potter’s decision to deploy a 3-man defence at the back line more logical.
Exploring Answers to Solve the Pressing System
Despite the press stopping Arsenal’s intention of progressing in the 1st half, there were a few times they got past the pressure which was by the rotations down the side. Mainly, this was done by the WG tucking in to receive from the wide areas as others moved out wide. The wide CBs who were responsible for marking Arsenal’s WGs did make the effort to stick to the player or pass it onto another defender, but made them free with regards to the long distance they travelled to receive.
It must be mentioned that this solution to the Seagull’s pressing didn’t work to the full potential due to the fact that either the WG received in too low of a position, or the defenders compressed the central areas with numbers. Therefore, whilst Arsenal was able to progress from the front line of the defence in this manner, they struggled to progress further and challenge Brighton’s back line.
Another way Arsenal progressed was through simple layoffs where a player would pass forwards then back to an open player. The man-marking system at Leeds United under Marcelo Bielsa saw this method being one of the major ways to break their defence down. The home team did have some success with this approach, but failed for it to become a significant solution to the pressing as they preferred short passes. Meaning that the pass routes from the back line to the deep areas were often closed down in the 1st half which is an important ‘in possession’ behaviour a team should follow when facing against a man-oriented pressing as discussed in the piece for Spielverlagerung.
The main solution came with the tactical changes made by Arteta during half-time, switching the structure to a 3 at the back plus 2 DMs in possession which created various problems for Brighton. With the use of 2 DMs, the initial pressing by the front line didn’t work since both Welbeck and Mac Allister would get pinned to them, not allowing for them to press the CBs. The pressing became more disconnected, increasing the time for the CBs to be on the ball which saw Arsenal play out from the back further up the pitch.
CBs on the ball without pressure / pressing disconnected
Another emphasis was placed on attacking the space in between the CBs via the wide player. From the starting position, 3 at the back were quite narrow, opening up pass routes out wide. Once the pass was made, a midfielder would make runs to attack the open gap in the back line. This forced Brighton’s midfielders, especially Mwepu to defend further down to the back line. Once the team in possession was able to congest the defenders in their own half, switching the play became more effective as well.
While Arsenal was creating an increasing number of chances up the field, Arteta decided to bring on Nketiah for Smith Rowe, the system changing into a 3–1–5–1, encouraging more fluidity up front to take control of the chaos in midfield.
The change in Arsenal’s attacking structure and Mwepu’s injury forced Potter to revert back into an extremely compact 4–4–2 / 4–2–4, looking to close down any space in between the lines. Although Arsenal had the opportunity to equalise before and after the 2nd goal was scored, in addition to the controversial off-side call, Brighton successfully wrapped up the game 2–1, the first win after a devastating 6 loss in a row and a draw against Norwich.
Covering the whole width of the pitch with only 3 players at the back line is, without a doubt, a risky decision to make. However, against an opponent who sets up as a 4–3–3 with a false 9 and WGs on both sides providing depth and width, it could be an interesting matchup to examine. With Brighton facing against Man City in 10 days’ time who likes to play this system, it would be interesting to observe how Brighton sets up out of possession.
Thanks for reading as always!
