The 21/22 season for Brighton was a massive success for them with gaining the most points and their first top half finish in the Premier League. Numerous contributions made this achievable, but a large portion of the credit has to go to the promising English manager, Graham Potter, who not only shifted the Seagulls into a highly possessional and positional adept team, but also competed against some of the best clubs in Europe with the same style. The defining characteristic of the team lies in their flexibility of systems both in and out of possession using different starting line-up week in and week out. According to a report published by the Premier League, Brighton used the most systems this season, 13 systems out of the 18, being the most fluid team in the league. The piece’s focus is on their structure in possession, divided into three sections which are build-up play, progression, and final third, examining how they aimed to solve various kinds of high-end pressing riddles.
P.S. Majority of this piece was written by July, which means that there is no content around the 22/23 season, but I hope it still gives insight into why Brighton are having a head start and what can be expected in the future.
Build up play
Adaptability of the back line
Regardless of the opponent’s defensive structure and the ways to overcome it, Brighton builds up the play deep, originating from the goalkeeper, Robert Sanchez. The Spaniard attempted the most passes from the position in the entire league this season which shows the skillset he possesses and how much the team is focused on playing in the area. By doing so, Brighton tries to lure opponents out of their fixed positions, creating gaps within the defensive set up and pick out the proper pass whether that’s going through, around or over the pressing shape. Safe options for the goalkeeper are necessary for this play to be successful, which sees the two centre backs in the back four or two of the three centre backs providing lateral passing options for the Spaniard. The defenders providing this support would not only position deep, but wide up to the edge of the 18-yard box or even wider to expand the defensive structure and open further options up the pitch, such as central options to the defensive midfielders / dropping attacking midfielders or the wide options to the full backs / wing backs.
In the game against Chelsea at the Stanford Bridge, a similar structure was seen with Veltman and Dan Burn providing the lateral support for the goalkeeper and the left wide centre back, Cucurella, reverting into a left full back position. As Chelsea defended in a 3–4–3 system, the deep build up play attracted opposing three up front, allowing Sanchez to make use of the midfield overload and play a pass through the first line of pressure to progress further up the pitch.
When transitioning from a build up play excluding the goalkeeper to including one, — normally a back pass following an organized pressure from the opponents leading to a back pass — Sanchez went out of the traditional keeper’s position in front of goal and out wide to the half lane. The movement created a diagonal back pass option for the centre back, especially when Brighton operates in a back three, establishing an angle for the pass to be completed easier. The back line then adjusted their positioning to form a four chain at the back incorporating the GK within it, which allowed for the wing backs to stay deeper up the pitch to pin the defensive line and deploy more players in between the lines. Smooth transition between the two build up structures grants the entire team to shift slowly with minimum movement but efficient positional advantages for the ball to move to the players.
The structure was also dependent on the opponent’s defensive organization and seemed to be determined pre-match, as was the case when facing against Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium. To counter the Citizens usual defensive set up of pressing high in a 4–5–1 with one of the centre midfielders aggressively applying pressure to the defensive line, Brighton always formed the deep build up play with the goalkeeper incorporated in a back four. This allowed for both wing backs to stay wide and deep to pin the defensive line and make use of the superiority in midfield to bypass City’s pressure.
Maximizing the use of sustained deep build up play including the GK, the team progressed up the field with the defensive line becoming separate from the GK. Brighton’s main match plan all season revolved around secure ball possession at the back line, leading to the use of a variety of set ups in this phase of play, utilizing both back three and back four, changing it numerous times during the match depending on the situation.
The opening fixture away at Burnley was an excellent example of this phenomenon as they switched from a four in the back line to a back three beginning from the second half. With regards to the initial 4–1–4–1 set up being heavily reliant on using the lone pivot as the third player via the wide full backs or the central midfielders in between the lines, the alternation of the system allowed Brighton to commit more players in between the lines by changing it to a 3–1–5–1 (3-diamond-3). Numerical advantage at the base of the build-up and stronger central occupation of the pitch saw the away team gain more control over the pressing scheme with more variety in the ways to progress to the final third. The game resulted in a 2–1 comeback for the Seagulls in the second half despite conceding in the first two minutes, and the season began with Potter starting the back line trio of Webster, Dunk, and Duffy. Dan Burn who went to his boyhood club Newcastle in the winter window, and Joel Veltman who ranked second as the player of the season in the 21/22 season would also join the back three due to Webster’s injury and the 1vs1 dominance they provided out of possession.
The back three usually operated in an expansive way, normally getting wider than the width of the 18-yard box and deep back to provide a safe back pass option for the players in and around the opponent’s defensive block. This structure forced the opponent strikers and wingers to make a decision on whether to apply pressure on the defensive line or to maintain the central compactness to cut out passing lanes in between the lines. A “dilemma” was created as a consequence with the former decision opening up the pivots roaming in front of the midfield line and stretching the defensive block for the space in between the lines to be used. The latter decision allowed freedom for the wide centre backs to drive forward.
In order to not get stuck in the rigid back three, certain positional adjustments were required to the individuals. For example, with the central centre back having to be the furthest backwards option which meant the safest option for the players wanting to play back, he always had to be in a place where a back pass was available for the ball holder and comfortably out of pressure following the successful back pass. The wide centre backs were then allowed to receive wide enough for the pass from the central centre back to be available but positioned forward enough to get past the first line of pressure with a single pass, resulting in an asymmetrical back line in certain moments.
An even closer look can be taken onto the individuals, with all the centre backs being very skilled at feinting, decreasing their dribbling pace to show the defender as though they are stopping or picking out a pass. After the opposing defender has directed his pressing towards the centre back, they would immediately accelerate to get past the pressure. The fine details on a team-level and an individual-level made Brighton’s back line more than what the system suggested, making it difficult for the opponents to adapt their forechecking shape.
However, with the increasing emergency of the back three in recent years, some teams have developed their way of pressing against them in variation. Although the defensive system, pressing triggers, and the areas the defensive team wanted to guide the Seagulls into were different, they gained success by sharing a common characteristic of dealing against the wide spread back three whilst adequately cutting off passes in between the lines and preparing a structure to press high by committing enough number of players up front to deny every option around the ball.
For instance, Everton enforced a 4–4–2 initially lying in the middle of the pitch, concentrated in the centre to force the attack wide. The back line was allowed to circulate the ball freely in certain situations, however, once the wide centre backs started to drive forward due to the central options being closed, Everton’s strikers locked the attack wide, just as though a full back can get stuck in a back four. The Toffees also prepared a high pressing structure when they needed to by making use of the enormous spatial coverage the double pivot, Doucoure and Allan, provided out of possession which saw them put pressure up to the Seagull’s double pivots but also regaining possession from collecting the second balls.
On the other hand, the rivalry match against Crystal Palace saw them press in a 4–3–3 with the wingers pressing the wide centre backs while blocking the pass route to Brighton’s wing backs. This manner of pressing resulted in Brighton’s attack ending with a long ball in behind to Welbeck or Trossard, struggling to take control of the match through stabilized build up plays. Because Brighton has a clear aim when using long balls such as the space behind the Palace full back in this case, it is crucial for the defending team to not overcommit players on high pressing as the front three is more than capable of running in behind or receiving in between the lines. Aston Villa under Steven Gerrard also prepared an interesting defensive set up as well, focusing on stopping the expansive back three by forming a 4–3–1–2 with two wide strikers. Not only did it enable Villa to maintain central control with the diamond midfield, the wide strikers stopped the wide centre back’s progression in a different way compared to previous examples.
These conflicts of not being able to progress to the final third and relying too much on direct plays led to a change in the back line from a three at the back where strong central coverage is available when defending, to a four at the back by sacrificing a centre back for another player in between the lines to take control of the area. Although the direct approach can sometimes act as the Seagull’s main match plan as seen in some of the fixtures against the Big Six, a secure build up is essential for the Seagulls to control the game which forms a base for every chance creation. In that sense, the change of the back line structure creates a different dynamism with different starting positions, movements, and angles of passes for a more continuous ball progression.
When setting up with a back four, the centre backs positioned themselves to provide a safe back pass option just like the central centre back did in a back three. Due to the more abundant options in front centre backs, they positioned much deeper compared to the back three, to the point that they seemed to be disconnected to the players in between the lines. However, it also made the opponents more careful at applying pressure on the centre backs as it would force the defensive structure to get stretched, allowing for the centre backs to utilize their ability to punch a quick grounder ball in between the lines or an aerial ball in behind to make use of the gaps generated within. Although they regularly distanced themselves centrally just wider than the centre circle when building up independent from the goalkeeper, they also had the freedom to move wide enough to the side-line if the situation required them to do so in order to fulfil the task of providing a back pass option.
Another integral part of the back four is the full backs who had to position very wide as Brighton often don’t employ a wide and deep winger when setting up with a back four. Therefore, they were often in charge of providing the width from their initial positioning. They also had the responsibility of positioning in a space where a successful pass from the centre back would allow Brighton to go around the opponent’s first line of pressure. As similar as this task may seem to the wide centre back’s role in a three at the back, the full backs were more focused in fulfilling this role due to the fact that the wide centre backs had to constantly maintain an access to the central centre back as it’s the only lateral option they’d have. Against an opponent with three up front, the full backs would position just in behind the wingers, while facing against a defensive structure with one or two up front had them positioned in line with the wide midfielders.
Patience to keep positioning in the indicated area was key to make this possible as the full backs dropping deeper in line with the centre backs lets the defender apply pressure while facing forwards when the full backs can be gaining positional advantage and granting more space and time for the central players to keep possession. The patience derives from the secured possession with the deep centre backs and appropriate support by the defensive midfielders up front which the analysis will touch in the following section.
When facing against high pressing teams, the detailed and patient positioning by the full backs often attracted the opposing full backs, opening space in behind to exploit with players with attacking profile such as Cucurella and Lamptey.
Reflecting on the previous and current defenders Potter has coached, it is evident that he has developed players capable of playing in multiple positions. Those include, Ben White, Dan Burn, Veltman, and Cucurella who have all played as a centre back, full back, and even as a wing back (Ben White has also played as a defensive midfielder on numerous occasions as well). The tendency of this development generates the adaptability in the back line, enabling easier alternation during the match. In various matches, the flexibility of the back line also allowed them to build up with a three at the back that turned into a four at the back when progressing into and attacking in the final third as one of the centre backs pushed deep and wide.
Rotation of unique profiled Defensive Midfielders to support build up play
The alternation of the system changing every matchday and commonly done live in-game sees the defensive midfielders switch from a single pivot to a double pivot and vice versa. With a diversity of Bissouma, Lallana, Groβ, Mac Allister, sometimes Alzate being available to play in this area, a flexible match plan was formed, choosing the proper defensive midfielders aligned with the plan. Here the term “defensive midfielders” and “pivots” refer to players playing around the space in between the opponent midfielders and forwards with the option of moving out to support the build-up play accordingly.
Bissouma has been the most consistent and chosen by Potter with the highest 90s (total minutes / 90), capable of playing both as a lone defensive midfielder and part of a duo. In possession, he has the physical and technical competency to keep the ball in high pressured situations, helping secure Brighton’s possession and creating time for others to transition to their attacking structure. The force he generates when driving forward with the ball is a strength no others in the team possess, producing another source of line breaking opportunities. The combination of all the traits and the extremely high rate of ball retention is indispensable for the team, making him Potter’s first choice.
When Bissouma was injured towards the beginning of the season, Lallana stepped up as the pivot providing more line breaking passes up front and sustaining a similar ball regaining rate as Bissouma with his intensive gegenpressing which he had shown in his previous club, Liverpool under Jurgen Klopp. On top of the pivot’s required tasks, Lallana had the capacity of making forward runs into the gaps between opponent defenders, providing the team with extra third man options. When the team was expected to have more of the possession, players such as Mac Allister and Groβ who normally plays deeper in between the opposition defensive line and the midfield line would be chosen. Mac Allister is one of the best when it comes to helping the team out in quick ball circulation, switching plays in minimum touches and comfortable at playing in compact areas which is often required when playing against a low block. Groβ’s positional flexibility of playing anywhere in the midfield then allows for proper support for the ball holder whether that’s dropping to receive, positioning deeper to receive in between the lines, or pinning the opponents.
Once the defensive midfielders who are fit for the match plan was picked, they now have to support the build-up play by connecting the back line to the players up front and ones providing width. Initially, the defensive midfielder would position in behind the gap of opponent forwards and midfielders, trying to receive so that the pass would go through the gap between two opponents. This simple concept is mentioned by Marcelo Bielsa in a conference held in Amsterdam where he calls “the line that joints two rivals” as a “door” and allows for eliminating the opponents when the pass goes through this gap. The “door” refers to as gaps not only for a vertical pass to go through but also the horizontal pass, and it serves as the main reference point for players to determine their positioning from the deep build up play to the attack in the final third.
Having a 4–4–2 as an example of the defending team’s system, a single pivot would reference the gap of the two strikers while the double pivot would have one positioned in a similar area and the other positioned slightly deeper to pin the midfielders or moving wide to receive in the space beside the tow strikers. Whereas against a 4–3–3, pivots would reference the gap between the three up front and had an attacking midfielder drop off in front of the opposing midfield line to fulfil this support if it wasn’t met by the pivots. This was a common concept shared with any kind of system Brighton used and faced against.
This positioning itself enables for a few progression options for the team, such as the “dilemma” that was introduced in the previous section with the expansive back line of three, better access to the far side centre back or ball side full backs when the pass route from the ball holder to the defender was unavailable, and using third man combination plays ending in the pivot. Consequently, a pivot would rarely move out of their central position when playing with a system that functioned with a single pivot. Players up front would then of drop off to receive in the space beside the pivot that had opened up or fill in for the pivot when they were unavailable. By having necessary support for the centre back, the full back can maintain their positioning patiently even if the pass route was cut out.
In coordination with the deep back line as mentioned before, the pivots were often allowed to drop in front of the first line of pressure when operating with a double pivot but not deep enough to be incorporated in the defensive line. This triggered the opponent midfielders to step out of position to put pressure, resulting in bigger space in between the lines for the players up front to receive.
The duo would also make movements towards the ball side, meaning that the near side pivot would position on the ball side and slightly deep to provide a forward option for the centre back whilst the far side pivot would position centrally. This led to a staggered and compact double pivot as a unit, providing abundant options for the ball holding centre back and also ensuring secure rest defence structure with players around the ball. Then, as the ball circulated to the side, whether that’s the full back, dropping wing back, or an attacking midfielder flowing to the side in between the wide centre back and the deep wing back, the pivots were tasked to provide a lateral option for the wide players by receiving through the “door” of opponent ball side midfielder and forward. Thus, the ideal positioning for the pivot proceeded in an area where they can receive a vertical pass and also through the horizontal door by anticipating that the wide player would receive the pass from the centre back. In combination with the back pass route provided by the centre back, the option in between the midfield line and the defensive line, and a player looking to exploit the space in behind saw the wide ball holder supplied with at least three or four options to play in.
If the striker were to close down the horizontal pass route, the centre back would have opened up for continuous ball circulation. If the centre midfielder had stepped out, the player in between the lines would open up as a consequence. The far side pivot would also position himself to receive through the door if the horizontal pass route was closed down, securing a way out for the wide ball holder depending on the opponent’s reaction. The wide progression method was a major force which pushed Brighton’s wide attacks regardless of the attacking system they used, creating overloads to attack down the ball side, or isolate the far side to utilize bigger space, which will be discussed further in the following theme.
Progression
When progressing up the field, Brighton loves to take control of the space in between the defensive line and the midfield line by overloading the area. It can be crowded to the point of having four players in the space, but in an organized manner with a specific discipline so that the players don’t clash with each other.
Pinning the defensive line
First of all, it is needless to say that the opponent’s defensive line has to be pinned accordingly by the planned players to open space in between the lines in order to make it more difficult for the defenders to step out. There are various ways of doing so which ends in Brighton forming a different system very frequently and moreover changing the individual’s movement to exploit certain gaps. The one most commonly seen across this season was the wing back positioning deep and wide, almost touching the side-line on both sides. They would rarely move centrally which allows for the central players in between the lines to roam around in their preferred areas. In this case, a player dropping into the space between the wing back and the centre back was one of the most repeated actions to aid Brighton’s ball progression, not only maintaining a sustainable access to the wing back from the centre back but also opening gaps in between the lines for other personnel to arrive in.
Some patterns start to branch out when wing backs were not required to position deep but rather low to support the centre backs, especially when Brighton played with a four at the back. One includes an attacking midfielder moving slightly deeper in between the opposing defenders or close to the FB as he prepares for a run out wide as soon as the opponent full back goes out of position to put pressure on Brighton’s wide players. Another run in behind was made if the deep midfield was on the far side, attracting the full back to open up the wide player. The positioning also stopped the centre back from applying pressure on the dropping centre forwards as the movement will open up opportunities for the attacking midfielder to attack in behind.
The centre forwards would cooperate in the pinning process as well by positioning deep and central in between the centre backs, working alongside a narrow front three or fluid structure in between the lines. Penetration in the central area of the pitch was often seen through a player in between the lines moving into the same vertical lane as the deep centre forward. A horizontal pass through the defensive block from the wide player allowed for a chance of penetration which was done by deep positioned Welbeck and Maupay roaming in between the lines. Additionally, Welbeck had the capacity of positioning deep and wide, usually towards the left-hand side, behaving as a target point for a long ball in behind whilst pinning the defensive line.
When playing with a system of two strikers, they would often position wide and outside of the opposing centre backs. As mentioned in the central midfielder’s positioning to stand in between the centre back and the full back, this allows for Brighton to pin the centre backs (the two wide centre backs in a back three) and run in behind or wide according to the defenders who were pulled out of position.
Regardless of how Brighton aims to pin the defensive line, it is crucial to understand what kind of space each and every player can express their strength in. The team selection and the match plan have to be executed so that nobody overlaps with one another, leading to less spatial occupation of the pitch, which generates insufficient connection between players for the pass to be made somewhere else. Over the course of three seasons under Graham Potter, most players have experienced multiple positions with different tasks to perform. These learning experiences developed an adaptive player with better decision-making knowledge to perceive when and where to occupy at a certain timing, working well within the flexible system changes and not overlay with others.
Control in between the lines
Once the defensive line is pinned at the back, Brighton can now utilize their numbers in between the lines. Needless to say, all the details described in the previous build-up play section, such as the defensive midfielders attracting the opponent midfielders also plays a part in opening up the targeted space.
The initial positioning by players, mostly a striker dropping off or a central and an attacking midfielder in between the lines sees them orienting themselves behind a gap, a “door”, created by two midfielders when the team aims for central progression. Additionally, the Seagulls would also try to receive beside the midfield line by altering their positioning slightly wide. Although the combination of these principles is shared with all the players trying to receive in between the lines, the “doors” they look to receive through will depend on the opposition defensive structure and the match plan which has a big impact on their positioning even when they’re playing in the same system. The full back’s positioning in line or just beyond the opponent midfield line aids for the doors to stretch, making the pass in between the lines to be more successful.
Whenever the team looked to progress from wide areas, players in between the lines looked to receive through the “door” created by two wide defenders (i.e., wide midfielder and the full back). This is similar to the movement defensive midfielders had to make, but in a deeper position. If this pass route was closed down, movements were made whether that was dropping deeper or attacking space in behind the defensive line in order to open the gap to be filled by others. Consequently, fluid rotations in between the lines was formed in order to constantly occupy this area and provide support for the wide ball holder. When examining some of Brighton’s matches, the wing backs are frequently seen making what seems as though a risky horizontal pass in between the lines, and a successful pass results in the elimination of more than three or four opponents at once.
The following paragraphs will examine some of the common systems Potter used and how it behaves to make the most out of the space in between the lines to receive in the area and support the team’s progression into the final third.
In a 3–4–3 (3–4–2–1), which ended as one of Potter’s most used system, all three players up front had the license to drop in between the lines. When Maupay played as a striker who tends to drop off quite often, Brighton would have two deep and wide wing backs to balance out with three players in between the lines. Welbeck as a striker provided the structure up front with a different dynamic, usually resulting in a narrow front three, with regards to the more vacant space due to Welbeck’s deep positioning. Passes between the front three were made much easier by maintaining a condensed connections between them whilst creating a confusion for the zonally oriented opposing defenders as the narrow structure made it more difficult for them to identify who was responsible for marking the front three. Space on the far side was generated as a result, triggering for a defensive midfielder to jump up the field to attack the space if needed.
The attacking midfielders rarely dropped off in front of the opponent midfield line due to the abundant support provided by the double pivot, but was more concentrated on making movements out wide in relation to the wing back’s positioning. Penetration in behind was also made by the attacking midfielders which attracted the full back to engage, subsequently leading to the wide player opening up. With regards to the progression down the side, 3–4–3 provided efficient support for the wide ball holder and was the most balanced, due to there being a pivot and an attacking midfielder on each side.
A back three system very similar to the 3–4–3 was used in a few occasions which was the 3–4–1–2, usually adopted through the use of low wing backs and the two strikers always ready to attack the space in behind. Therefore, the asymmetric structure up front due to the difference in the strikers’ movements was another key element, along with the more direct approach it produced.
Another common back three system introduced is the 3–1–5–1, quite often implemented by Julian Nagelsmann in the Bundesliga teams he has coached. There are a few ways of describing this such as the 3–4 (diamond)-3, 3–1–3–3, or 3–3–3–1 depending on the perception of the viewers, but with a similar fundamental of a back three followed by a single pivot which is connected to the three midfielders in between the lines. Width and depth were regularly provided by the deep and wide wing backs in this system, with the option of the lone striker dropping off, resulting in a max of four players in between the lines. Attacking midfielders were guided to make more movements with the overload in between the lines and more open space around the pivot compared to the 3–4–3.
Despite the fluidity, the beauty of the system prevails in the fact that even if one derives out from the usual position to provide more options for the ball holder, others are able to fill in the proper spaces and “doors” with ease whilst maintaining a balanced structure on the far side. Despite the risky nature of only having four players at the back and 6 players up front reducing the security of the rest defence, it creates more points to place a line breaking pass and generate deadlier threat on the opposition as there are more players attacking behind the midfield line. Not only did the system aid Brighton’s progression on the ground but also in the long ball approach as the positional superiority the midfielders gained was optimized by a higher chance of collecting the second ball. This trait saw the system being used frequently against the Big Six opponents.
Systems incorporating a back line of four defenders saw more variations being put in place as the structure itself afford depth and width to the attack whilst the back three will always be in need with wide players on each side. More players up front meant different shapes in different positions to be designed. Within the back four systems, the most favoured was the 4–3–1–2 system. It can be described as more attacking even when compared to the 3–1–5–1 as the diamond shape midfield is maintained and a centre back is sacrificed for another striker up front. The structure provides as many options in between the lines as 3–1–5–1 with more central occupation of the opposing defensive line and stronger focus on getting past the first line of pressure and stretching the midfield line with low full backs to support centre backs’ build up play.
A different variation of the back four system was the 4–2–2–2, again a system without a deep and wide winger as mentioned in previous sections as Brighton’s main characteristic when operating in a back four. The starting position itself is in shape for Brighton’s wide progression method, but also created fluidity in behind the midfield line with attacking midfielders’ movement of attacking space out wide or positioning deeper in between the centre back and the full back to pin the defensive line. As the movement occurred, both strikers had the license to drop in between the lines, creating a partial 2vs1 against the full back or the centre back. The high verticality of the system afforded the Seagulls with more speed during the direct attacks as well. Due to the initial positioning providing great central occupation of the pitch with easier transition from the 4–4–2 defensive structure, the system was utilised when the team were desperate for stronger security in defensive transitions. These phenomena were represented the most against the match at Anfield, creating confusion for the opposing defensive line by a constant central rotation of the front four (2 strikers + 2 attacking midfielders) as well as deep back line to slow down the pressing scheme and full backs always looking to penetrate in behind the first line of pressing.
Some systems were only used in limited occasions such as the 4–2–3–1 and the 4–3–3. The former system functions as a midway point of 3–1–5–1 and 4–2–2–2, with a similar structure up front with the lone striker and the three in between the lines. It’s also identical to the 4–2–2–2 in a way that the double pivots provide enough coverage in front of the opposing midfield line which allows for the attacking midfielder trio up front to keep roaming around the space in between the lines whilst the back four remains to stretch the midfield line. The latter system was one of the unique systems where Brighton used a wide and deep winger alongside the back four from the initial positioning.
Aside from the rather symmetric systems, asymmetric systems were deployed for the purpose of meeting Brighton’s aim and showcased some of their unique innovations. These included a 4–2–4 structure to maximise the individual superiority of Tariq Lamptey on the right-hand side seen at matches against Leeds and Newcastle, and placing three wide players to counter against Villa’s 4–3–1–2 pressing as mentioned in the build up theme.
By occupying the areas in between the lines through different systems as described above, the opposition midfielders are in a situation where Brighton players try to receive in behind their back or move accordingly to support the progression. This led to a secure ball possession in the back line due to them not being able to commit and press the Brighton defenders driving forward or the pivots receiving in front of them. Once the defender commits, the player waiting in between the lines suddenly becomes open, providing an option to progress forward and accelerate the attack into the final third.
In terms of maximizing the positional and the numerical advantage in midfield, numerous fixtures saw Brighton’s back line designed similar to the opponent’s structure up front, meaning that it wasn’t rare for Brighton to possess the ball with a back three against a 4–3–3, or using a back four against a 4–4–2. This was done in order to attract opponents up front to open up the midfield area, implicating that the back line didn’t just serve the role of creating a spare player at the back line. Brighton achieved the overlooked concept of building up and progressing with the same number of opponents pressing the back line with appropriate support whilst the opposing back line was pinned effectively.
Behaviour in the final third
Wide adaptive triangles
Brighton’s progression into the final third tends to end in the wide areas for several reasons, one being the fact that the wide areas provide more successful counter-pressing with the limited angle of options and make the opponent’s counterattacking distance further. Another factor is heavily related to the pace of Brighton’s attack in the final third. According to the English Premier League Season Metrics 2021–2022 provided by Stats Perform, Brighton ranks as the third slowest attacking team in the whole league, ranking above some of the Big Six team’s where the attack tends to get slower due to the nature of many teams preparing a deeper defensive block.
The slow nature of the attack gives Seagull’s a time to prepare their rest defence structure at the back, having a better security of possession to restart the attack. Interestingly, unlike other teams trying to have individuals that can be advantageous in 1vs1 situations in the deep and wide positions, the seagulls would often have players with rather opposite characteristics such as Cucurella, Veltman, Groβ, and Moder. These players’ strengths don’t lie in their individual quality to drastically change the situation out wide and attract opponents to free up other teammates.
With that in consideration, there’s no such productivity to deliver the ball as quick as possible to the wide player, and proves that Brighton has to prepare a progression route independent from the wide player’s sole quality, building a network of players out wide for efficient combination plays to be done which is another factor for a slow-paced attack. Brighton does have players who can increase the wide 1vs1 dominance such as Solly March and Lamptey who combined played over 30 games this season and ranked in the top 5 of attempted dribbles on the team. However, they were used as a substitution plan for half of the matches played and lack the ability of consistently gaining individual superiority over Premier League full backs which increases the need for sustainable and reproductive structure to create chances not reliant on certain individuals.
On the pitch, this network refers to the wide triangles Brighton creates, including the wide player, a player providing a back pass option for the wide player and one that positions in front of the gap (door) between the centre back and the full back (the piece will name this space as the “pocket”). A player positioning in the pocket can subsequently support the wide ball holder by receiving through a door created by two wide defenders which has been the main wide progression support in any area Brighton had possession in. The starting position of these players can be flexible regarding the situation of the game and the characteristics of the opponents. For example, a substitution can be made to eliminate the back pass option and make the triangle more attacking with a player in between the centre back and the full back.
Once the shape of the triangle is determined, a patterned sequence of movements and combinations follow to penetrate further into the box. The first and the most frequently occurring pattern is the run targeting the space in behind opposing full back and centre back. This can be made by a straight-forward run from the player in the pocket, but also by a player not participating in the ball side wide triangle in some cases. The run provides the wide player with a forward option to play to, as well as pulling out the centre backs or forcing the defensive midfielders to drop back. Depending on how the opponent reacts, the centre forward would join in to provide and exploit the space opened up by the run whether that’s attacking the gap in between the centre backs or dropping off to receive in the space the defensive midfielder had previously occupied.
The player occupying the pocket can stay in the space to receive if the gap is open with opposing defensive line being retreated into the box, vacating the space in between the lines. By positioning in the blind side of the defending full back, a quick horizontal pass eliminated the opponent with an immediate chance creation. However, that is not often the case with top end defensive structures where they’re extremely compact and agile to close down this space. Therefore, a player in the pocket will look to drop off from the initial position at times and in front of the opposing midfield line, leaving the pocket open for a dynamic occupation of the space. The wing back were allowed to make a diagonal run into the pocket, as well as the centre forward moving across lanes to receive in the space, or even the wide centre backs underlapping to receive in the pocket and further attack the space behind if necessary.
One last crucial part of the triangle includes the player providing a back pass option for the wide player. This position can be fulfilled by a low full back, ball side pivot, and a wide centre back, securing a way out for the ball holding wide player to go back and restart the attack. This player tends to be slightly inverted compared to the wide player, but in a close proximity for quicker counter-pressing to be executed. When the player is in possession of the ball, he is surrounded with opportunities of continuous combination within the wide triangle and a central penetration (passes to players in between / in behind). A lateral passing route is also provided mainly by the defensive midfielders, usually positioned in between the opposing midfielders and the forwards in order for an easier switch of play to be performed. Also, when the defensive structure is retreated to the point that even the back pass option is marked, the central centre back in a back three or the ball side centre back in a back four would shift their positioning to ensure an emergency option to pass back.
Movements within and around the box when crossing
The emphasized attacks down the side in the final third consequently leads to more crosses into the box and Brighton, ranking as the league’s fifth most frequently crossing team, has to execute with physically inferior players when compared to Premier League centre backs. To make the most out the limited resources, there is a tendency on areas where players make runs into, as well as maintaining a structure on the far side and around the box to minimize the damage from counter attacks.
The movements within the penalty box are nothing out of ordinary, with players aiming for the near post, space behind the opposition far full back, and in between the gap of defenders. In terms of the priority of where to make the runs, the strongest emphasis was placed on the near post with diagonal runs being made there as the player attacking the gap in between the defensive line served the role of pinning the defenders to open up space for others. Welbeck’s physical capability saw him position more on the far side to meet the cross whilst small runners aimed for areas closer to the ball. Due to these runners who got closest to the goal, the defensive line was forced to drop back and opened up space for cut backs to be made as a result. A popular location for a player to arrive in was the penalty spot and sometimes in the half lane for steeper angle of cut back to be completed. The concept of receiving through the door still remained similar until this area as well.
Around and outside of the box, Brighton is known for their strategic distribution of players to allow intensive gegenpressing to be made in case of the loss of possession and for more secure rest defence structure. First of all, one to three players were usually placed on the edge of the box in order to fulfil the role of collecting close range second balls and also establishing a cut back option for the crosser. This area was mainly occupied by the pivot or the centre midfielders, with the option of the far full back / wing back and the wide centre back joining in. The central midfielders naturally positioned around the area due to the fact that they had to provide a lateral option for the back pass option in the wide triangles as mentioned previously, but the latter two defenders participated in this process by the means of different contexts.
In terms of the far full back / wing backs, they had to follow the rule of tucking in over to the width of the 18-yard box when the team attacked further into the final third, closing down potential options for opponents to initiate counter attacks from the far side. Because of this, full backs and wing backs naturally occupied the edge of the box with the wing backs having more chance to attack the space behind the opponent full backs. Whilst for the wide centre backs, they were regularly tasked to follow the forwards with a rather man-marking style of rest defence which led to them pushing up to the area in relation to the opponent’s movement. The structure allowed for better initial contact to be won which was followed by intensive gegenpressing and press backs by players up front to regain possession and start over the attack.
Conclusion
The analysis examined how Brighton behaved in possession using multiple systems with different personnel over the course of the 21/22 season, creating an opposition specific numerical and positional advantages by altering their number and shape of the back line, pivots, width provision and concentration of players in between the lines by effective pinning of the opposition’s deepest line. The attack is then followed by a non-system specific behaviour in the final third where Brighton looked to attack the wide spaces via wide triangles with appropriate support around.
Throughout the piece, one might have identified that there are very few significant rotations in positions when Brighton have possession with every player positioning around their starting positions. Once players reach their designated position, they remain in their place if the player’s aim is fulfilled. If not, they will make movements in order to receive in or attack different gaps and spaces generated in the defensive block with others reacting to the movement (“attacking midfielder moving wide leading to the wing back positioning deeper” as one of the many examples).
Players’ movements are therefore restricted to minimum ones across vertical lanes and horizontal lines created within the defensive block. Here, the player’s freedom is then regarded to as their selection of movements when deriving from their initial positions and the on-the-ball decisions in which the both will alter by the characteristics of the players.
The core principles set for players to be adept in any change of tactical systems in-game is also noticeable, as it plays a big part in functioning the manager’s intention of changing up the system ever so slightly. Reasons behind the changes doesn’t necessary conclude to improving the quality of ball progression in which the piece mainly focused on, but other elements such as the factors out of possession and in transitions. However, one cannot change the system while demoting the quality in possession as it will cause other conflicts. Although there is no doubt that the change in the starting position when attacking can create different dynamism on the pitch, players need to be able to play in any tactical system Potter decides to employ in which the core principles are aimed to help without being confused with changes one after another.
It can be concluded that Graham Potter has successfully built a team that looks to solve the opponent’s pressing riddles by static positionings with minimum but required rotations for continuous ball possession to receive through the “doors” and logical chance creation in his 3 seasons at the team. The whole movement as an attacking structure is reduced, meaning that Brighton has to keep changing the shape of the system in order to change the dynamics of the game when one isn’t working. Pep Guardiola once described the team as “Everyone plays in his position (and) the ball come in the position, not the players moving” which perfectly summarises Potter’s football identity.
Looking at two of the best teams in the same tier of English football, Liverpool will try to break down the opponents by operating in a similar system but with fluid movements within the structure. While Manchester City goes through a systematic change periodically, they don’t change their overall shape significantly through matches but deal with it by different tendencies of movements every individual orchestrates. Overall, when examining the most recent edition of modern football, there is a tendency that teams keep a certain system for a long period of time and brush up it up so that they can adapt in any situation the opposition may pose. In the midst of these teams, Brighton under Graham Potter will always look for a way to attack with a well-suited system for the problems opposition pressing cause by developing a flexible team structure and individuals fit to play numerous roles.
Written by: Yuma Shibamoto
Data from: Fbref & Stats Perform
Thank you so much for reading! I hope you enjoyed it. Brighton & Hove Albion in 21/22 season will always be a special team to me :)
