One of Brighton’s attractiveness is their courage to play the positional game against every opponent they face, no matter where the opposing team is placed in the table. The clash of two tactical minds, Pep and Potter, is always interesting to observe considering the fact that the former praised the other as ‘the best English manager’, and the latter publicly stating that his style of play is influenced from Pep’s time at Barcelona.
This piece will examine the solutions City proposed in order to break down Brighton’s risky pressing, and how Brighton played in possession.
Similar Pressing Strategy vs Arsenal
Back line without a FB or a WB
Brighton pressed Man City in a similar way as they did against Arsenal with only 3 players covering the whole width of the pitch. 2 players up front (Welbeck & Groβ) were responsible for pressing the ball holding CB whilst blocking the pass route to the DM (Rodri), and CMs (Mwepu & Caicedo) in charge of strictly following City’s CMs.
Communication was vital within the 3 in midfield as they had to switch marks when City’s midfielders changed positions. The WGs (Lamptey & March) beside them maintained pressing access to the FBs, ensuring that the passes in between the lines were shut off by positioning slightly central.
Finally, the core of this defensive structure, the DM (Mac Allister), watched City’s CF drop off and also move up the pitch to press Rodri when the pressure by 2 up front were disconnected. Despite the fact that Bissouma might have been the first choice, Mac Allister performed excellently in this role, not opening up unnecessary space in the middle and also providing a smoother circulation of the ball in possession.
The decision by Potter to utilize the pressing system is reasonable as both Arsenal and City set up their ‘in possession’ structure using a 4–3–3 with a modern striker (Lacazette / B. Silva) preferring to receive in between the lines and FBs starting from a low position in order to support the CBs in the build-up play.
Solutions by City
The solutions in which City proposed had some overlaps to the ideas Arteta came up with, but also including some new additions.
First of all, a great emphasis was placed on CMs’ run in behind. This applies to De Bruyne and Gundogan, especially the latter gaining lots of success with the movement which saw him scoring 13 goals in the Premier League last season. The movement was done numerous times across the 90 minutes in order to attack the gap between the back line, Emile Smith Rowe undertaking a similar task for Gunners.
City also achieved great success with their defenders driving forward. With the CBs positioning as wide as the boundary of the outermost lane and the half lane, it made Seagull’s 2 up front more difficult to stop the progression from City’s back line. By pulling Brighton’s midfielder out by the CM’s movement, bigger space opened up in front of the defenders in possession.
Another source for City’s progression was from counter-attacks. The aggressiveness of Seagull’s counter-pressing right after they lose the ball is one of the best in the Premier League, marking the highest percentage of successful pressure (squad gaining possession within 5 seconds of applying pressure) according to Fbref.
In simple terms, this is due to the high number of players applying pressure around the ball and minimum coverage at the back to regain the misplaced pass by the opponents. However, with City’s technical capability of playing under high pressure, they were able to get past it by finding the deepest player in one or two passes. Some players were positioned wide in order to attack Brighton’s weakness in transition moments which Gerrard pointed out as the space beside the 3 CBs. This pinned the back line from engaging into the player receiving in between the lines, hence allowing for progression further up the pitch.
Once City reached the final 3rd, Brighton struggled to get out from the low block with wide WGs forcing the away team’s WGs to defend further back alongside the wide CBs. Consequently, creating an open player amongst the back line or in the midfield to pick out a pass.
Brighton’s Solution against City’s 4–4–2
Maximizing the Midfield Advantages
The match saw Brighton having the least possession % in all competitions this season, yet the effective combination of logical long-ball strategy and their usual build-up play from the back is worth taking a look at.
The home team pressed in their most basic form of bringing De Bruyne higher up the pitch from their 4–3–3 and transforming into a high pressing 4–4–2. Intending to break this pressing down, Brighton utilized a 3–1–5–1 (3-diamond-3) system with wide positioned 3 at the back and stretched / deep 3 up front.
The key point with both the long-ball and the usual build-up approach was the numerical / positional advantage Brighton gained in the midfield. Through the effective use of Sanchez in goal, the away team attracted the pressing and targeted the players around City’s defensive line. Once they had duelled in the air, there was always a free player in midfield to regain the 2nd ball due to the high number of players the pressing team committed.
The numerical advantage was also used through the build-play on the ground, accessing the open CM via straight forward pass by the CBs or using the DM to bait City’s midfield. The latter progression route is only possible with Mac Allister’s ability to play the ball accurately under 2 touches, playing a key role both in and out of possession.
Tactical Alternations in the 2nd Half
This led to Pep altering his pressing structure just slightly, with WGs pressing the CBs if B. Silva’s pressure was avoided in any circumstances. The change in City’s defensive manner led to fewer occasions for De Bruyne to go out of his CM position to press the CB, which then resulted in both Gundogan and Rodri to not worry about jumping on to Seagull’s DM when needed.
If Seagulls were successful at getting past the WGs’ pressure, City’s FB were responsible for stepping out to put the pressure on. Albeit the change, City still had problems managing the midfield, but got the upper hand at forcing mistakes due to the increasing number of players staying in the midfield area. Therefore, the match had City dominating in possession, and even if Brighton were successful at getting past the 1st line of pressure, they couldn’t progress further enough to actually challenge Ederson in goal.
More tactical adjustments followed with the use of substitutions. The first one saw Webster in for Lamptey, changing the back line from 3 to 4 at the back. March moved over to the right side and Welbeck on the left in order to attack the space behind the FBs. With a sacrifice of a player in midfield to put one more in the back line, Webster now had the task of marking De Bruyne who were making tons of runs in behind rather than dropping off.
However, once Brighton had made this change, De Bruyne started to move to the sides in regards to less gaps in the defensive line. It can be described as a moment where a player’s adaptation on the pitch surpassed the coach’s game.
The second and the third sub saw Sarmiento for Caicedo and Maupay for Welbeck. Due to the initial defensive set up not allowing for sufficient pressure to City’s CBs, Brighton changed to a classic 4–3–1–2, the CM trio moving side to side to put pressure on the FBs.
Despite the changes, the 3rd goal came in for the home team which clearly represented the FBs stepping out and Brighton’s struggle to go further from getting past the 1st line of pressure.
Maybe not as a Brighton fan, but a fascinating match to watch from a tactical perspective, two managers with similar minds going against each other. Looking forward to the future fixtures when they face again.
Thanks for reading as always!
